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Abstract 
This study analyzes the degree of competition through individual actions and reactions. 
Empirical support for this analysis has derived mainly from structural econometric models 
describing the nature of competition. This analysis extends the existing literature by 
empirically considering a direct measurement of competition through the analysis of the 
competitive actions and responses, and describing how firms compete within and between 
strategic groups. We estimate the firms’ conduct in the Spanish deposits market with 146 
firms and 18,888 observations. This is a specially compelling context for the banking 
industry, in which a deregulation process gives rise to the adoption of aggressive strategies 
seeking to increase the market shares of deposit accounts; thus, producing a turbulent 
situation of increasing rivalry. Our results offer a deeper understanding of the firms’ 
competitive behavior, since we identify different patterns of actions and reactions depending 
upon the strategic group the firm belongs to.  
Keywords: competition; strategic groups; mixed logit model. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There has been an increase in empirical research in both economics and business fields that 
analyzes and quantifies the degree of competition (Eilon, 1993; Furrer and Thomas, 2000; 
Heiman, 2010; Liu and Nagurney, 2011; Pech and Slade, 2003; Schiavone, 2011; Sinha, 
2000; Tsai and Hung, 2009; Wang et al., 2011; Xiao and Qi, 2008; Yan, Tang and Lee, 2007; 
Yao and Liu, 2005; Zhang, 2006).  
Particularly, the banking industry has fuelled a large stream of literature on competition 
and has been a topic of considerable interest, especially since the 80s, when significant 
changes in structure and competition took place in several financial markets (Lozano-Vivas 
and Pastor, 2010; Maudos and Pérez, 2003; Oroz and Salas, 2003). During the 80s, many 
western European countries implemented structural changes in the banking industry in 
response to the processes of deregulation and to the need to achieve the level of 
harmonization required for the establishment of a single and competitive European market. 
The Spanish banking industry was not an exception to those important changes, moving from 
a situation of tight regulation and protection to a new situation characterized for an increased 
competition. Essentially, the deregulation process implemented in Spain concerned both, the 
competitive conduct of firms (liberalization of interest rates, fees, etc.), and the structure of 
the sector (foreign bank entry, removal of geographical controls on branching, etc.) 
(Jaumandreu and Lorences 2002). When the deregulation process went to an end at the earlier 
90s, both commercial and savings banks adopted aggressive strategies seeking to increase 
their market share of deposit accounts (Carbó, Fernández, Humphrey and Maudos, 2009), 
which completely transformed the environment of stability during the 70s into a turbulent 
situation of increasing rivalry at the earlier 90s. Thus, the Spanish banking market provides an 
interesting test case for analyzing competition on complex industries undergoing 
deregulation. 
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To date, most of the researchers that have empirically studied banking competition have 
used structural econometric models from the Industrial Organization approach to describe the 
nature of competition and to identify the specific game being played between competing 
firms. Previous studies have measured Spanish banking competition estimating conjectural 
variations (e.g., Carbó et al. 2009), and Lerner index, or Panzar and Rosse H-statistic (e.g., 
Maudos and Pastor 2003). These studies, framed in the Industrial Organization approach, 
estimate a single parameter to infer competitive conduct in the industry, given that the attempt 
of empirically analyze the competitive interaction between the large number of firms 
comprising the banking industry may entail an extremely difficult or impossible estimation 
(which could be affected by the availability of degrees of freedom). To overcome this 
limitation and trying to provide more accurate information through the estimation of more 
than a single parameter for the entire industry, we follow the works by Porter (1985) and 
Putsis and Dhar (1998) and we examine competition by distinguishing how firms compete 
within and between strategic groups in an industry.  
The existence of strategic groups has direct implications for the behavior of firms and 
their competitive interactions (Yu, Wei and Brockett, 1996; Leask and Parnell, 2005; Mas-
Ruiz, Nicolau-Gonzálbez and Ruiz-Moreno, 2005; Prior and Surroca, 2006; Mas-Ruiz and 
Ruiz-Moreno, 2011; Epure, Kerstens and Prior, 2011). In this sense, there are two main issues 
in the rivalry and strategic group research (González-Moreno and Sáez-Martínez 2008). The 
first one is related to the fact that the detection of strategic groups helps managers to get a 
better knowledge of their industry, and therefore, a precise identification of their rivals. The 
second main issue is the distinction of the nature of intra- and inter- strategic group rivalry 
(Porter 1976, 1979; Peteraf 1993; Cool and Dierickx 1993, among others). Regarding the 
banking industry, empirical studies implemented under the Industrial Organization approach 
to assess the competition in the field of strategic groups (Spiller and Favaro 1984, Berg and 
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Kim 1994, Burke 1990, Coello 1994, among others) has grown over time and has provided a 
series of propositions on the competitive interaction of firms.  
We extent the existing literature by empirically considering: (a) a direct measurement of 
competition through the analysis of the competitive movements, which has a 
multidimensional character as it considers strategic firm actions and responses (Smith, Grimm 
and Wally, 1997), and constitutes a difference from previous banking empirical research from 
Industrial Organization approach (e.g., Coccorese 2008, or Carbó et al. 2009). Actually, this 
direct measurement (exemplified and presented in minute detail in section 3.1), which is 
based on the use of press information to subsequently analyze competitive actions, is a 
significant contribution of the article. Accordingly, the proposed method allows us to identify 
the primary actors and all those that respond with a temporal order of response to an initial 
action; and (b) describing how firms compete within and between strategic groups, which 
allows us to shed light on the dilemma intra- versus inter- strategic group rivalry and to offer 
different rivalry interpretations of the resulting strategic groups formed instead of a single 
parameter for the whole industry. Specifically, we use the history of the industry to identify 
strategic groups according to firm size, and we analyze and describe the type of competition, 
within and between strategic groups. To do so, we conduct an empirical analysis of data 
collected from the Spanish bank-loans market with 146 entities and 18,888 observations and 
between 1992 and 1994 (i.e., the period after deregulation), through an econometric approach 
based on the Mixed Logit Model estimated by Bayesian procedures, which allows capture of 
any firm’s reaction structure and operates with specific information for each firm.   
 
2. THEORY: LITERATURE REVIEW  
2.1 Banking competition and strategic groups 
Since the first use of the term strategic groups by Hunt (1972), strategic groups are considered 
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as one dimension of an industry’s structure and an important topic in the field of strategic 
management research (Ketchen et al., 1997; McGee and Thomas, 1986; Thomas and 
Venkatraman, 1988; Panagiotou, 2007) that studies, for example, the persistence of profits or 
of competitive interactions between firms (Peteraf 1993). Prior literature on strategic groups 
has considered the following key topics: the emergence of strategic groups; performance 
differences between groups; the stability of a group structure; and the rivalry within and 
between strategic groups. Regarding the last one of these topics, an interesting question that 
has emerged is whether rivalry is greater between members of different groups than between 
members of the same group. Porter (1979, 1980), Ramsler (1982), and Hatten and Hatten 
(1987), for example, have examined how factors such as the strategic distance between firms, 
the number and size distribution of groups, and the interdependency of groups in the market, 
which differently affect rivalry within and between strategic groups. However, there is no 
consensus in previous studies when discussing this question.  
On the one hand, the idea that rivalry between strategic groups is greater than within 
groups has been supported with several arguments. The first one is that intra-group rivalry is 
rare because the members of a group are able to recognize their mutual dependence with 
greater ease (Caves and Porter 1977; Porter 1976, Peteraf 1993). This argument is supported 
by the resource-based view of the firm, in that members of the same group will have similar 
endowments of resources, which will lead them to act and react to competitive disturbances in 
similar ways and consequently be better able to predict each other’s actions and reactions and 
recognize their mutual dependence (Smith et al. 1997). Another argument is that a high level 
of rivalry exists between strategic groups because, other things being equal, a greater strategic 
distance makes tacit coordination more difficult (Hunt 1972; Porter 1976; Caves and Porter 
1977), due to the fact that different strategies on the part of firms could lead to a lack of 
congruence in goals (Newman 1973, 1978). This suggestion is also supported by the resource-
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based view of the firm, in that differences between strategic groups are usually the result of 
heterogeneous resources and varying patterns of competitive behavior, which will make it 
difficult to predict and coordinate actions with rivals across the groups (Porter 1980; Smith et 
al. 1997).  
On the other hand, the idea that rivalry between strategic groups is greater than within 
groups has been criticized in the literature (Cool and Dierickx 1993). In fact, the hypothesis 
that tacit coordination among firms is more successful between firms that have similar 
strategies or between firms within a group that have similar resources has been challenged as 
follows (Gimeno and Woo 1996): i) Strategic distance (lack of strategic similarity) could 
facilitate tacit coordination by making it easier to know whether a rival has overstepped its 
tacit boundary; and ii) according to the resource-based view of the firm, a greater intra-group 
rivalry could be the result of homogeneity of resources among its members (Barney 1991; 
Bogner and Thomas 1994), given that each firm is trying to achieve the same goals but does 
not have unique resources or isolation mechanisms that would enable them to gain a 
competitive advantage (Smith et al. 1997).  
Alternatively, Smith et al. (1997) suggest that the fundamental question pertains not to a 
comparison of within and between group rivalries, but rather to the behavior of groups 
themselves. We extend several works (e.g., Dranove, Peteraf and Shanley, 1998) whose 
theories of strategic groups and collusion hold that the group's identity is based on the actual 
behavioral relations and interactions among its member firms. Accordingly, we use the concept 
of strategic group trying to have a better understanding about the competitive behavior of 
groups in the banking industry through the comparison of within and between group rivalry.  
Although some authors like Day et al. (1995) indicate that conflicting results could be 
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attributable to the lack of multiple criteria1 and inappropriate selection methods in the 
identification of groups, we follow Dranove, et al. (1998) by suggesting that the degree of 
rivalry within and between strategic groups depends on the size of the firms that constitute 
that group. We support our decision to define strategic groups according to firm size on the 
institutional/historical approach of the industry, originally proposed by Porter (1979), and one 
of the more widely accepted approaches to explaining the configuration of strategic groups 
(see Porter, 1979; Peteraf, 1993). Porter (1979), for example, links an analysis of an industry's 
history to an a priori definition of strategic groups based on firm size and group-level effects2. 
Therefore, we analyze the history of the industry—in our case, the Spanish banking 
industry—to form size-defined strategic groups. Dranove et al. (1998) recommend that 
researchers identify groups a priori based on a deep institutional knowledge of the industry 
which would allow them to search for barriers to mobility and define the limits of the groups 
in a temporal period. Peteraf (1993) accepts that if the industry’s legal regulations lead to a 
certain strategic group structure, it will be possible, following an a priori theoretical approach, 
to identify different company classes, which are sufficiently different in their scope, 
resources, and strategic profile, to constitute separate strategic groups (Thomas and 
Venkatraman, 1988). A large number of empirical studies, most importantly those of Smith 
and Grimm (1987), Corsi and Grimm (1989), Corsi, Grimm, Smith and Smith, (1991), Zajac 
and Shortell (1989), and Peteraf (1993), among others, follow this institutional/historical 
approach and analyze the impact of deregulation on firm strategy and/or performance. 
Essentially, we similarly consider historical and institutional contexts (for a historical 
analysis of strategic groups in the Spanish banking industry, see “Spanish banking industry”) 
as criteria for defining strategic groups a priori through firm size, with size serving as a 
                                                 
1 Several works use multidimensionality for forming strategic groups (i.e., Pehrsson, 1990). Regarding the 
banking industry, Ray and Das (2010) and Epure et al. (2011) cluster banking ratios to form groups.  
2 For a more extensive explanation of the firm size effects on group behavior, see Mas-Ruiz and Ruiz-Moreno 
(2011). 
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determinant of group behavior. 
2.2. Spanish banking industry 
The Spanish banking market provides an interesting test case for analyzing competition on 
complex industries undergoing a deregulation process, which, in this case, was fully 
completed by 1992. In particular, two types of regulations have influenced the history of the 
Spanish banking industry: the regulation of firm behavior through the setting of prices 
(interest rates), and the regulation of market structure through the control on the savings 
banks’ geographical expansion (Gual 1992; García-Cestona and Surroca, 2008).  
Although prices and controls on fees were liberalized in 1987, the regulation of interest 
rates since the 60s removed price competition and induced the larger banks to compete 
through investing more in services and client proximity (i.e., through expanding their branch 
networks). In this sense, the branch structure of the Spanish banking industry is the result of 
the competition generated in a context of regulated interest rates: the broadest branch 
networks belong to the largest banks, which can then provide their clients with the most 
comfortable service (Sánchez and Sastre 1995).  
The regulation in the 1970s and 80s of the Spanish banking industry's geographical 
expansion created a market wherein financial firms operate at either the national, regional, or 
local level. However, these geographical restrictions were applied only to savings banks. That 
is, savings banks were permitted to make strategic geographical choices but these choices 
were limited to either regional or local, but not national, markets. No such limits were 
imposed on commercial banks. Therefore, large financial firms that have offices in numerous 
regions face a different (and more diversified) competitive structure and socioeconomic 
reality than small entities operating in only one territory (Carbó et al. 2003). Boeker (1991) 
and Burke (1990) both find that a firm's size parallels its classification according to 
geographical spread; indeed, national entities are generally larger than those with a regional 
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scope, which in turn are generally larger than local entities.  
Factors like the removal of branching restrictions on savings banks’ geographical 
expansion since 1988, and the integrating effects of the entry of Spain into the European 
Community (EC) in 1986 (nowadays European Union (EU)), induce to the concentration of 
the banking industry. First, the removal of branching restrictions created, on the one hand, the 
expansion of large savings banks to the national level and, on the other, the defensive 
formation of small savings banks into geographical groups. The latter was achieved through 
an accelerated process of mergers and acquisitions primarily involving savings banks 
operating in the same markets. Second, Spain's membership in the EC also concentrated 
banking through additional mergers and acquisitions, which, in turn, completely affected the 
domestic competitive environment. In particular, banks underwent mergers and acquisitions at 
the end of the 1980s to increase the size of Spain's financial entities for the purpose of 
competing in the broader European market and preserving market power. 
To sum up, regulation/deregulation and institutional structure demonstrate that size is a 
defining characteristic of the Spanish banking industry (Espitia, Polo and Salas, 1991), which 
explains why several authors (e.g., Freixas 1996) have used size to identify three distinct 
strategic groups: larger banks, which are national in scope and distinguished by their 
extensive branch networks; medium banks, which are regional in scope and have a significant 
presence in a few local markets; and smaller banks, which are to a greater or lesser extent 
functionally or geographically oriented toward a single local market. For the latter two 
categories, the relevant markets are, respectively, the Autonomous Region and the Province 
(Gual and Vives 1991). Therefore, following the strategic group as defined by Dranove et al. 
(1998), our analysis of Spanish banking industry supports differentiating strategic groups 
based on the size of their member banks. 
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3. THE MODEL 
3.1. Sample and variables. 
Our sample includes 52 savings banks and 94 commercial banks over a two-year period 
(1994-1995). Because in that period, the financial entities in our sample covered more than 
96% of the Spanish deposit market, we are able to proceed with an effective analysis of the 
market structure. We excluded from our sample the credit unions because of their residual 
participation and those banks that either lacked the data necessary for our empirical analysis 
or had data that seemed likely to contain errors.  
We conduct an empirical analysis of data from the Spanish banking industry between 
1994 and 1995 (i.e., the period after deregulation in 1992). This period of time is characterized 
by a change in the economic cycle of Spain with the start of a period of recovery and by an 
increase of competition after a long deregulation process (see “Spanish banking industry”).This 
time-specific change is fundamental to the study of competition between banks, as it allows 
us to identify the two determining factors of the strategies and performance of the sector: 
economic situation and competition. In periods of recovery, situational aspects and 
competitive pressure have the opposite effect on margins, which allows us to better estimate 
the impact of competitive erosion and to obtain more precise results than those generated by 
previous analyses (Freixas, 1996). 
Our variables fall into two main categories: 
i) Variables for delimiting the groups.  
Firm size: the total monetary value of deposits issued at the end at the end of each year 
of the analyzed period. We define deposits broadly to include the sum of “debits to clients”, 
“debits represented by negotiable shares” and “other debits” reported on the balance sheet. As 
do other studies on the Spanish banking sector (e.g., Freixas, 1996), we consider the three 
aforementioned strategic groups: large banks, medium banks, and small banks. We establish 
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the following limits of each group by identifying a certain homogeneity in the scope of each 
group's markets—based on the parallelism between company size and geographical spread 
(Boeker 1991; Burke 1990): large firms with a national scope who deposited more than 2 
billion pesetas, medium firms with regional scope who deposited between 415,000 million 
and 2 billion pesetas, and small firms with a local scope who deposited less than 415,000 
million pesetas for the year 1995. Doing so enables us to see that while two firms may be 
similar in size, they belong to different size classes because they have different geographical 
scopes. The first group (i.e., GI) contains the six largest firms and constitutes 41.0% of the 
deposits market. The second group (i.e., GII) contains 27 medium banks and constitutes 
35.6% of the deposits market. The third group (i.e., GIII) contains the 113 remaining firms, 
which are the smallest and account for 21.1% of the deposits market. 
Li: Lerner index of bank i. We chose this variable because it is the relative margin 
suitable for analyzing the evolution of competence for two reasons (Maudos and Pérez, 2003): 
i) oligopolistic competition models determine a equilibrium relationship between this relative 
margin and the structural and competitive conditions of the market; and ii) this relative 
margin is the best proxy for the social welfare loss suffered due to market power. As stated 
before, Dranove et al. (1998) focus on firms’ strategic interactions to develop a theory of how 
strategic groups form. According to the authors, a strategic group exists only if the 
performance of its member firms is a function of the group characteristics or, in other words, 
if we can predict a firm’s performance based on the group to which it belongs. We build on 
this approach by arguing that groups display interactions as a function of the size of their 
member firms. Following Mas-Ruiz and Ruiz-Moreno (2011), while rivalry remains our 
focus, it is rivalry's link to performance that allows us to determine whether group interactions 
derive from the size of the group’s members. 
The AEB (Asociación Española de Banca), and the CECA (Confederación Española de 
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Cajas de Ahorros) publish the information required for elaborating these variables. 
ii) Variables used for representing the competitive behavior: 
The method used to identify the banking competition has been reported from the work 
by Smith et al. (1997), framed within the Strategic Management perspective, and it is focused 
on the rivalry movements between the involved firms. In this line, rivalry is defined as the 
interchange of competitive movements between the firms of a market (Porter, 1980). 
Therefore, Smith et al. (1997) propose the examination of competitive actions and responses 
as an alternative to the study of competitive interaction. Accordingly, we hinge on the fact 
that the way in which a company acts and responds in a market determines its performance 
(Porter, 1980). Stemming from Schumpeter (1950), Smith et al. (1997) define “competitive 
actions” as specific and detectable competitive movements, such as price cuts, the launch of 
new products, expansion into new markets and special promotions, initiated by a firm to 
defend or better its relative competitive position. A “competitive response” is a discernible 
and observable competitive movement of counterattack (to an initial competitive action), 
undertaken by a firm with respect to one or more competitors to defend or better its position 
(Porter, 1980). 
Consequently, we analyze the content of a collection of news items published in 
newspapers and specialized magazines, on the competitive actions and responses of the 
entities (e.g., new branches’ opening, the launch of new products, moves of the interest rate, 
etc.). News items were obtained from Baratz Database, which gives a summary of news 
published in 28 national and regional publications. The way of operating in the database was 
initiated with the distinction between actions and responses. The identification of the 
competitive responses was effectuated by selecting news items which contained expressions 
such as ‘in response to...’, “following...”, “under pressure from...”, “reacting to...”, etc., taking 
as a starting point the last day of the time period (31 December 1995). Next, we looked for the 
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news of the initial action, to which each response referred, going back one day at a time until 
1 January 1994. Finally, we identified the competitive actions, to which no competitive 
response could be observed. This method allows us to identify the primary actors and all those 
that respond with a temporal order of response to an initial action. For example, Banco 
Central Hispano (included in the strategic group of the larger banks) reinforced its 
promotional activity on its main bank account as responding to Banco Santander’s (also in the 
strategic group of the larger banks) increase in promotion expenses on its new product 
“superaccount”; consequently, the competitive move by Banco Central Hispano was 
considered as a competitive response to an initial competitive actions by Banco Santander. As 
a result of this method, we identify 126 actions, 38 of which provoked at least 1 response, and 
82 responses. The distribution of competitive movements between entity types is balanced: 
143 competitive movements are taken by commercial banks and 65 by savings banks (taking 
into account that the sample used in this research include twice as many commercial banks as 
savings banks). Table 1 summarizes the statistics for the main categories all the competitive 
movements (actions and responses) identified through this method.  
Note that “geographical expansion” and “launch of new products” stand out among the 
categories of competitive behavior; however, if the type of entity is considered, while the 
former is equally sought by both commercial and saving banks, the latter is far more prevalent 
in the “commercial banks” category. A similar asymmetrical pattern is found for “new 
distribution channels” and “promotion”. “Operative movements” are equitably distributed 
between both types of entities. Additionally, if the variable “size” is introduced in this 
descriptive analysis, “promotion” and “new distribution channels” are clearly preferred by the 
largest entities; “geographical expansion” and “operating movements” while following this 
same pattern the differences are smaller.  Interestingly note that “launch of new products” 
seem to be more common among the smallest entities. 
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--------INSERT TABLE 1----------- 
Although one can find some level of selection bias in this data set, the truth is that the 
use of Spanish economic press as an information source has obvious appeal (Suárez-Zuloaga, 
1995). The strong competition between economic publications to provide news items, which 
leads them to publish even smaller firms’ operations, and the small number of stock market 
quoted firms, which makes it important to follow the non-quoted firms’ news (i.e., the larger 
proportion of the total number of firms), attenuate the possible over-representation of the 
larger firms in the press. 
3.2. Econometric analysis 
To analyze the type of competition within and across strategic groups we rely on the Mixed 
Logit Model estimated by Bayesian procedures, which allows capture of any firm’s reaction 
structure and operates with specific information for each firm3. We use the Mixed Logit 
Model because of its ability to deal with the unobserved heterogeneity of firms, by assuming 
that the coefficients of the variables vary among them. This technique has been previously 
used in the banking literature, like the work by Pestana-Barrosa, Ferreira and William (2007), 
which analyzes the determinants that explain the probability of a bank operating in the 
European Union being the best (worst) performer. 
Following the formal approach of Train (2009), the reaction function Rn for firm n is 
defined as 
n
G
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G
j
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3Train (2001b) points out the following advantages of Bayesian procedures over classical procedures: i) they 
avoid the usual problems of global and local maximums, given that they are not based on the maximisation of 
any likelihood function; and ii) they obtain consistent and efficient estimations under more flexible conditions. 
The advantages of Bayesian estimation have been little used by choice researchers, and only through the work of 
Albert and Chib (1993) have different techniques been developed for their application (Allenby and Ginter, 
1995; Lenk et al., 1996).  
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where Aij is a vector that represents the actions of a firm in group j against a firm in 
group i; βij is the vector of reaction coefficients; and εn is a random term that is iid extreme 
value. The likelihood of the observed choice yn (to react or not) for firm n conditional on 
parameters b and W (mean and variance of βn, respectively) is expressed as  
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where φ is the function of Normal distribution. 
Let k(b,W) be the prior distribution of parameters b and W4. Bayes’ rule allows the 
analyst to obtain the posterior distribution K(b,W,βn/Y) for the group of choices and of the 
sample firms (n=1,..., N) as: 
∏
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The posterior distribution has three parameter types to estimate θ={b,W,βn}: the average 
b, the variance W, and the parameters of each firm βn, from which we obtain the reaction 
functions of each firm and, therefore, the reaction structure. The estimation of the parameters 
is obtained through the following expression 
∫ ⋅= θ θθθθ dYK )/(ˆ  
This integral has no closed solution, which leads the researcher to use a procedure of 
estimation by simulation. Therefore, θ is estimated as the average of the simulated drawings. 
However, the posterior distribution K(θ/Y) does not always take the form of a known 
distribution from which one could immediately take draws. Train (2001a), in the case of 
                                                 
4 In general, it is assumed that b has a Normal distribution and W an Inverted Gamma distribution (or Inverted 
Wishart distribution in the case of multi-variation) of type f(W)=W-(v+1)/2e-vs/2W with v being the degrees of 
freedom and s a parameter of scale to be estimated. 
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choice models, suggests the use of Monte Carlo Markov Chains; specifically, the sample 
simulation algorithms of Gibbs and Metropolis-Hasting for the draws of the density function. 
Train (2001b) also demonstrates that the estimator of the simulated average of the posterior 
distribution is consistent, asymptomatically normal and equivalent to the estimator of 
maximum likelihood. 
 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Before commenting on the results about competition, we describe the strategic groups in 
terms of operating cost and performance. Regarding the marginal cost, differences are found 
across strategic groups. Specifically, the marginal costs of GI (i.e., 0.019) during the analyzed 
period are significantly lower than those of GII (0.024), and GIII (0.028) (ANOVA: F = 17.2, 
p < 0.0001); this expected outcome derives from large firms' scale and scope economies. We 
also find significant performance differences across groups (ANOVA: F = 5.11, p < 0.0068). 
Actually, the margins (measured by the Lerner index) obtained in each group increase from 
GIII (0.133) to GII (0.158), and again from GII to GI (0.199). It seems that the average firm 
performance in each strategic group decreases as the size of the member firms decreases. 
These findings therefore confirm that a firm's profitability is affected by the size of its 
competitors.  
Regarding the competition analysis, we employ a direct measurement through the 
analysis of the competitive actions and responses in the Spanish banking industry with 146 
entities and 18,888 observations. Table 2 classifies competitive movements corresponding to 
the news of action and responses between entities (distinguished by strategic group). 
Following Smith et al. (1997), we apply a chi-square test in order to see whether between-
group rivalry is greater than within-group rivalry. The lack of significance in the results does 
not allow any conclusions on whether between group rivalry is higher than within-group. This 
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result might have relevant methodological implications (as indicated in the Conclusion 
section) as this way of measuring rivalry might well unearth some hidden interconnectedness 
that other methods cannot fathom out. 
 
--------------------------INSERT TABLE 2--------------------- 
However, a detailed analysis of the horizontal and vertical percentages of Table 2 
allows clarification of the competitive behavior of strategic groups. It is observed that 3 (30 
percent) of actions taken by GII are responded to by GI, while 21 (36 percent) of GI actions 
are responded to by GII. At a response level (% vertical), it seems that GII tends to respond 
with more ease to GI (75 percent of the responses by GII were to actions of GI) than vice 
versa (8 percent of the responses by GI were to actions of GII).  
On the other hand, 40 percent of GII actions are replicated by GIII, while 26 percent of 
GIII actions are responded by GII. With regard to responses, 21 percent of GIII reactions were 
to GII actions, and 14 percent of GII reactions were to GIII actions. Finally, 10 GI actions are 
replicated by GIII, while 6 GIII actions are counterattacked by GI. In terms of responses, 52 
percent of GIII reactions (52%) were to GI actions as opposed to 17 percent of GI reactions to 
GIII actions. It seems that GIII tends to respond with more ease to GI than vice versa.  
Next, we estimate the firm’s conduct within and across strategic groups in order to 
identify different patterns of actions and reactions depending upon the strategic group the firm 
belongs to. The estimation results from model specified above are as follows. Table 3 presents 
the results of the estimated model in the Spanish deposit market and suggests that there are 
significant differences across strategic groups.  
--------INSERT TABLE 3----------- 
Firstly, and regarding the competition within each one of the strategic groups, our 
model detects an independent behavior within groups GII and GIII and an aggressive conduct 
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within the group GI (see Table 3). That is, while the larger firms (GI) react to actions coming 
from firms within its own group (β11), we do not find the same behavior within GII and GIII, 
which suggest that the firms in strategic groups GII and GIII do not experience any 
competition from the firms in their groups, or, in other words, medium (GII) neither smaller 
firms (GIII) do not react to actions initiated by firms of GII and GIII, respectively (β22 and 
β33). By contrast, our empirical analysis detects a competitive behavior between the large 
firms (i.e., GI) of the Spanish deposit market. Thus, when a larger firm makes a competitive 
move, it meets with a strong retaliation from other larger firms. Taken together, these findings 
provide evidence of an asymmetrical rivalry within strategic groups. 
Secondly, Table 3 reveals the following findings on the analysis of competition across 
strategic groups: Regarding the rivalry between groups GI and GII, our empirical study finds 
positive and significant β12, which suggest that larger firms (GI) strongly react to the actions 
coming from the medium firms (GII). In the same line, we also find a positive and significant 
β21, showing that GII also respond to the actions coming from larger firms. To be precise, the 
competition between groups GI and GII is characterized by a non-cooperative behavior, i.e., 
an action of a larger firm (medium firm) is met by a competitive response of its medium 
(larger) rival (β12 and β21). 
Regarding the rivalry between groups GI and GIII, our empirical analysis reveals that 
while β13 is significant and positive, β31 is not significant, which suggest an asymmetrical 
competition between firms of these strategic groups. Accordingly, while larger firms (GI) 
strongly respond to the actions coming from the smaller firms (GIII), these firms do not react 
to actions from the GI firms. That is, the GI firms have a more aggressive attitude toward the 
GIII firms than vice versa. This finding, along with our findings on both the interaction 
between the GI and GII firms and the rivalry within GI, provides evidence of a clear pattern 
of competition on the part of the GI firms. That is, this analysis characterizes GI firms as 
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competitive agents who will respond aggressively to every attack, no matter where the initial 
action comes from (β11, β12 and β13).  
Finally, and regarding the rivalry between groups GII and GIII, our study also detects 
that β23 is not significant, while β32 is significant, but below the 10 percent level. That is, 
while the GII firms, which are specialized in regional markets, do not react to actions coming 
from the GIII firms, which are specialized in local markets, the GIII firms show some reaction 
to actions coming from GII firms. It would seem that medium (GII) and smaller (GIII) firms 
are exclusively focused on the attacks coming from firms in the immediately larger size 
groups, GI and GII respectively, rather than attacks coming from firms in smaller size groups. 
Through the association of the different patterns of competitive conduct within and 
across strategic groups, the findings would suggest the following: i) A strongly competitive 
situation is detected between larger (GI) and medium (GII) firms in the Spanish deposit 
market, although only the larger firms (GI) react to actions coming from firms within its own 
group, while medium firms (GII) do not show a reaction to competitive moves within GII; ii) 
Competition between GI and GIII is referred as the “dominant-fringe” behavior5. The 
dominant firms (GI) have a strong retaliation from other dominant firms (as we mentioned 
before), while the fringe or weaker firm (GIII) may not be willing to take the dominant firm 
on directly (β31), hence accommodating its larger rival’s action (in this analysis, the term 
accommodate could be understood as the lack of responses). The fringe firm finds some 
retaliation from the dominant firms with no reaction from the other fringe firms; iii) Finally, 
the findings allow to characterize the competition between GII and GIII as the “leader-
follower”6 (Stackelberg) behavior, in which the medium firms (GII) act as the leader ones 
                                                 
5 The “dominant-fringe firm” behavior predicts that a dominant firm expects strong retaliation from other dominant 
firms, while it expects accommodation from the fringe firms. Moreover, a fringe firm should expect some small 
retaliation from the dominant firms with no reaction from the other fringe firms (Spiller and Favaro, 1984). 
6 The “leader-follower” behavior implies that one firm reacts to changes in it’s rival’s actions (the “follower”), 
while the other (the “leader”) does not (Putsis and Dhar, 1998) 
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(i.e., they do not react to the smaller firms’ (GIII) actions), while smaller firms react to actions 
coming from GII. 
Finally, it is important to stress the fact that the rivalry varies not only according to the 
strategic group but also to the type of entity as well as type of action. In this regard, take as 
examples “promotional activities” and “new distribution channels”, which are mostly 
conducted by commercial banks (rather than saving banks) and especially those included in 
the large-sized firms; and “launch of new products”, which are prevalent in commercial banks 
included in both large- and small-sized companies. 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
There has been an increase in empirical research that analyses and quantifies the degree of 
banking competition, especially since the 80s, when substantial changes in structure and 
competition took place in the Spanish banking industry, as well as in other European 
countries, affected by a deregulation process that completely affected the domestic 
competitive environment.  
Therefore, the objective of this paper is to analyze and describe the type of competition 
extending the previous studies by empirically considering (a) a direct measurement of 
competition through the analysis of the competitive actions and responses and using an 
econometric approach based on the Mixed Logit Model estimated by Bayesian procedures, 
which constitutes a difference from previous banking empirical research from Industrial 
Organization approach, and (b) describing how firms compete within and between strategic 
groups. To do so, we use a sample from the Spanish deposits market of 146 entities and 
18,888 observations to analyze the competitive behavior within and between size-defined 
strategic groups.  
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Our analysis of the empirical data reveals the following. Regarding the rivalry within 
groups, only the larger firms (GI) react to actions coming from firms within its own group, 
but this is not the case for medium (GII) and smaller firms (GIII). However, and concerning 
the rivalry across groups, larger firms (GI) strongly react wherever the initial action comes 
from, leading to a non-cooperative behavior between GI and GII and a dominant-fringe 
behavior between GI and GIII; as for the competition between GII and GIII the Stackelberg 
behavior is found, the GII firms acting as the leader.  
This study can help managers weigh the opportunities and risks of alternative courses of 
action and responses. As such, the implications to firm management of these results are as 
follows: Firstly, this research advances on the utility of the strategic group concept by 
suggesting that different competitive behavior may be predicted by the size of the strategic 
group members. Following the proposal of Chen (1996), managers should analyze their 
competitive environment from the point of view of the firms within their own or different 
size-defined strategic group. Second, the findings should ultimately offer valuable 
information to strategic decision-making (Chen, Smith and Grimm, 1992). Initiators of 
strategic actions should consider whether these actions can be designed and implemented such 
that they do not prompt other firms to retaliate. The attributes of firms within and outside the 
size-defined strategic group may provide a useful frame of reference. Third, when deciding 
how to remain competitive, banking managers must consider the direction of a rival’s most 
likely response. Thus, our description of the competitive pattern presented here could prove 
very important to the assessment of the effectiveness of an initial action, or how likely a 
rival’s response depending on its strategic group membership is. Fourth, at the level of public 
management, knowledge of an industry’s competitive pattern facilitates both the detection of 
illegal competitive actions (e.g., collusion) and the quantification of the impact that such 
actions have, for the purposes of assigning a monetary penalty to them. 
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Also, academic implications are obtained: from a methodological viewpoint, when 
analyzing competitive reactions derived from the news of action, we find a lack of 
significance, so no conclusions can be obtained regarding whether between group rivalry is 
higher than within-group.  It certainly means that, at the very least, some intuitive, real-life 
information, such as press information, should be used in competition analysis –to 
complement, back or even qualify other more rational methods. From a theoretical 
perspective, and paralleling the previous approach, this outcome emphasizes the validity of 
the use of “perceived competitive movements” that can be contrasted against the more 
prevalent and employed “cognitive approach”. While “perceptions” does not necessarily have 
to coincide with “cognitions”, their comparison might help reach a more detailed and 
comprehensive rivalry analysis. 
The current study is not free from several concerns. First, in identifying the competitive 
movements in the banking industry, we used news published in economic national press 
publications. Although, the analysis of news items content allows a more complete panorama 
of Spanish banking as it covers all the groups in our study, it could be affected by: i) the 
nature of the source, as these competitive movements could be better seen as “perceived 
competitive movements”; and ii) the quantity of news items published on financial firms in 
the printed press – a quantity that falls as firm size falls. Second, the market data used in this 
study were chosen on the basis of being an interesting case of competition, but the banking 
industry has many particularities regarding its structure and competitive conduct and its 
results are not generalize. Then, the concerns regarding the current study might have affected 
the conclusions we draw for a particular market.  
We consider the following to be valuable directions for further research. First, since this 
paper uses past data right after the end of a deregulation process of the banking system, this 
analysis could be useful on the background of the recent financial crisis and may be replicated 
23 
once we have enough ex post data. Second, in order to corroborate the obtained results, the 
current study could be done analyzing other industries as well as other time periods. Third, it 
would be interesting to test whether rivalry varies over time by applying different 
methodologies (Kadiyali, Sudhir and Rao, 2001). Forth, different ways of identifying strategic 
groups, like those using multiple criteria, could be introduced in order to test if the results on 
rivalry are influenced by different methods of forming groups. Fifth, an interesting line for 
future research is to consider a different source of data by analyzing “declared competitive 
movements” from the banks’ annual reports instead of using news published in economic 
national press publications. Finally, replication of this analysis in the credit market would 
shed some light on resemblances and differences in a firm’s competitive conduct (deposit vs. 
credit market). This would imply identifying whether there are specific competitive actions 
related to risk and, more specifically, monitoring of loan portfolios.  
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Table 1. Analysis of strategic behavior between strategic groups  
 
Categories of Behavior GI GII GIII 
Total per 
category 
By commercial 
banks 
By savings 
banks 
Promotion 7 1 2 10 9 1 
Geographical expansion 31 17 18 66 36 30 
Launch of new products 25 19 27 71 60 11 
Operative movements 17 13 7 37 19 18 
New distribution channels 12 6 6 24 19 5 
Total per group 92 56 60 208 143 65 
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Table 2. Rivalry between strategic groups in terms of responses  
 
Responses  
Actions 
G.I G.II G.III Total of rows 
G.I Large entities 
% rows 
% columns 
26 
45.6% 
74.3% 
21 
36.8% 
75.0% 
10 
17.5% 
52.6% 
57 
69.5% 
G.II Medium entities 
% rows 
% columns 
3 
30.0% 
8.6% 
3 
30.0% 
10.7% 
4 
40.0% 
21.1% 
10 
12.2% 
G.III Small entities 
% rows 
% columns 
6 
40.0% 
17.1% 
4 
26.7% 
14.3% 
5 
33.3% 
26.3% 
15 
18.3% 
Total of columns 
% rows 
35 
42.7% 
28 
34.1% 
19 
23.2% 
82 
100.0% 
χ2    3.60 
a=Prob.<0.01; b=Prob.<0.05; c=Prob.<0.10. 
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Table 3. Estimation results 
 
Within group 
competition 
Across groups 
competition 
GI GI vs. GII 
β12 3.679ª (0.935) β11 5.059ª (0.521) β21 2.039
b 
(0.878) 
GII GII vs. GIII 
β23 1.046 (0.710) β22 0.295 (0.730) β32 0.794
d 
(0.473) 
GIII GI vs. GIII 
β13 3.825ª (0.300) β33 -0.163 (0.734) β31 0.211 (0.556) 
Constant 
-7.923ª 
(0.372) 
ML -447.27 
a=Prob.<0.001; b=Prob.<0.01; c=Prob.<0.05; d=Prob.<0.10 
The estimated variance of each parameter and the standard error of 
this estimated variance are as follows: V(β11)=10.981 (14.758); 
V(β12)= 190.990ª (24.833); V(β21)= 28.011 (17.860); V(β22)= 
17.939 (17.524); V(β23)= 13.636 (12.977); V(β32)= 0.462 (0.411); 
V(β33)= 13.648 (10.012); V(β13)= 0.641 (0.545); V(β31)= 23.346 
(17.229); V(βconstant)= 0.917d (0.472). For the sake of clarity of 
Table 3 and interpretation of the competitive reactions we do not 
place them into it 
 
 
 
